A CONVENIENT PATH FOR THE BRAZILIAN BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT: EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY* **

Initial Considerations
Studies of the separation of powers in presidential regimes have suggested a
supremacy of the executive branch. 1 Throughout North America, this supremacy
stems from crisis or calamity situations;2 in Brazil, however, it is uninterrupted, and
independent of any extraordinary events.3 The supremacy of the Brazilian executive
branch stems from the convenience status of the other branches, which fail to or are
unable to constrain the executive expansion. In addition, the historical and political
factors, the constitutional design and the proactivity expected of the executive branch
add to this inability. Some examples include constitutional amendments (CAs) and
provisional measures (PMs), which this study uses to demonstrate that showdowns
are avoided for the convenience of the branches, but the consequence of their
avoidance is the supremacy of the executive.4 Progressive CAs produced by the
executive with little risk of legislative rejection and judicial control over the
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1
The dominance of the executive is a particular feature of presidential regimes. From a postMadisonian perspective, given some of the inter-branch showdowns and economic and political crises,
the executive appears to have assumed a "super-activist" status.
2
The crises are significant because fundamental institutional reforms take place over a brief time even
as existing institutions struggle to fulfill their mandate. Sometimes, the existing institutions simply
claim more power than they were understood to have. At other times, Congress rouses itself to act, but
only to confirm a seizure of power or discretion by the executive, or to impart vast new powers.
POSNER, Eric A. VERMEULE, Adrian. The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic.
Oxford University Press: New York, 2010, p. 32.	
  
3
While Brazil boasts an apparent judicial supremacy, whether through expressions that attempt to
reiterate the prominence of the judiciary as "having the last word," the "last guardian of the
Constitution," among others—or by statements from various authorities, including the President, in
which the executive has shown sufficient capacity to avoid the final decisions of the Supreme Court,
specifically in some cases of federal tax matters.
4
Episodes of confrontation between the institutions in a given context.

provisional measures are political-juridical maneuvers to maintain inter-branch pax
while simultaneously promoting constitutional redesign.
Liberal legalism fails when it assumes that the executive will submit to the
rule of law. In the case of the American Administrative State, party politics 5 and
public opinion6 clearly play decisive roles in constraining the executive branch. The
Brazilian "State of Convenience," however, has not yet fully overcome its nearly twohundred-year-old authoritarian and interventionist tradition. Even after the adoption
of the 1988 Constitution, both the legislature and the judiciary as well as, in some
ways, the executive, fail to undertake their minimum required institutional roles.7
Moreover, the Brazilian public is apathetic, with no well-defined public opinion, and
rarely intervenes in governmental dynamics.
The present study aims to demonstrate that the Brazilian executive is an
expanded branch that bypasses the formal distribution of constitutional competences
and is supported, at the convenience of the other branches, through the use of
constitutional instruments such as constitutional amendments and provisional
measures that suit (i) the maintenance of an executive supremacy and governance, (ii)
an uninterrupted constitutional redesign and (iii) the prospect of continuous
constitutional emergency.
The Redesign of the Constitution: Constitutional Amendments
Despite the fact that amendments to the constitution have a high political
cost,8 in both the Brazilian and American contexts, a significant number have been
proposed by the Brazilian executive during the two presidential terms of Fernando
5

“Partisanship undermines the separation of powers during periods of unified government.” POSNER,
E.; VERMEULE, A. op. Cit. p., 27; LEVINSON, Daryl J.; PILDES, Richard H. “Separation of
Parties, Not Powers.” Harvard Law Review, 2006	
  
6
POSNER, E.; VERMEULE, A. op. cit., p. 4.	
  
7
This problem stems from a failure of the mutual control mechanisms (checks and balances) and, ipso
facto, the rule of law. 	
  
8
Art. 60 of the Brazilian Constitution provides for the legitimate proposal of amendments to the
Constitution by the following: a) at least one third of either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate
members (the two parliamentary houses at the federal level), b) the President of the Republic, or c)
more than half of the legislative assemblies of the federated states. The proposal must be examined by
two chamber committees and then by the plenary, undergoing two rounds of voting, each of which
requires three fifths of the votes for approval. Once approved in the chamber, the proposal is sent to the
Senate, and examined by a committee and by the plenary, undergoing two rounds of voting, each of
which requires three fifths of the votes for approval. Once approved by both houses, the proposal is
promulgated by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate Boards (management bodies) and published in
the official dissemination media when it comes into force.
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Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1995–2002), a member of the Brazilian Social Democracy
Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira - PSDB). However, the number of
amendment proposals by the executive branch decreased after the ascension of the
Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT)—Lula (2003–2010) and Dilma
(2011–2013)—to the presidency. This reduction was due to a decrease in partisan
coalescence (internal cohesion) despite an increase in the government base’s
coalition.

Period
1995–98
1999–02
2003–06
2007–10
2011–12

181
303
254
353
373

Chamber
35.28%
59.06%
49.51%
68.81%
72.71%

Composition of the National Congress9
Base
Opposition
Senate
Chamber
34
41.98% 93
18.13%
7
41
50.62% 109 21.25%
12
31
38.27% 259 50.49%
50
49
60.49% 160 31.19%
32
62
76.54% 111 21.64%
18

Senate
8.64%
14.81%
61.73%
39.51%
22.22%

Assessing the level of governance largely depends on the presence of
coalescence and not just on a partisan coalition. Although the PT governments
formally formed coalitions that were numerically superior to those of the opposition,
they lacked coalescence, creating a less unified government. Conversely, coalescence
9

Considering the alliances for electoral support during the 1995–98 and 1999–02 periods, which were
as follows: the PSDB, PFL [Partido da Frente Liberal/Liberal Front Party] and PTB [Partido
Trabalhista Brasileiro/Brazilian Labor Party] and the PSDB, PFL, PPB [Partido Progressita
Brasileiro/Brazilian Progressive Party], PTB and PSD [Partido Social Democrático/Social Democratic
Party] (base), and the PT, PSB [Partido Socialista Brasileiro/Brazilian Socialist Party], PC of B
[Partido Comunista do Brasil/Communist Party of Brazil], PPS [Partido Popular Socialista/Popular
Socialist Party], PV [Partido Verde/Green Party] and PSTU [Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores
Unificado/United Socialist Workers' Party] and the PT, PDT [Partido Democrático
Trabalhista/Democratic Labor Party], PSB, PC do B and PCB [Partido Comunista Brasileiro/Brazilian
Communist Party] (opposition). The PMDB [Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian
Social Democracy Party] representatives were not aligned because they lacked uniformity of support or
a base. From 2003–07 the support base consisted of the PT, PL [Partido Liberal/Liberal Party], PSB,
PTB, PDT, PPS [Partido Popular Socialista /Popular Socialist Party], PC of B, PV, PMN [Partido da
Mobilização Nacional/Party of National Mobilization], PSD, PST [Partido Socialista dos
Trabalhadores/Socialist Workers Party], PSL [Partido Social Liberal/Social Liberal Party] and PSDC
[Partido Social Democrata Cristão/Christian Social Democratic Party]; and the opposition was
composed of the DEM [Democratas/Democrats] (formerly PFL), PMDB [Partido do Movimento
Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian Democratic Movement Party], PSDB, PP [Partido
Progressista/Progressive Party], Prona [Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional/Party of the
Reconstruction of the National Order] and PSC [Partido Social Cristão/Social Christian Party]. From
2007–2010 the support base consisted of the PT, PMDB, PP, PR [Partido da República/Party of the
Republic] (resulting from the merger of PL and Prona), PSB, PTB, PDT, PC of B, PV, PSC and PRB
[Partido Republicano Brasileiro/Brazilian Republican Party]; and the opposition was composed of the
PSDB, DEM, PPS, PSOL [Partido Socialismo e Liberdade/Socialism and Freedom Party], PMN and
PTC [Partido Trabalhista Cristão / Christian Labor Party]. From 2011–12 the support base was
composed of the PT, PMDB, PR, PDT, PSB, PC of B, PRB, PSC, PP and PTB; and the opposition
consisted of the PSDB, DEM, PPS and PSOL.
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was present in the PSDB governments in which the addition of a few independent
parties in the Congress was sufficient for approving political programs, creating a
more unified government.
These changes led to a reduction in the use of formal amendments to the
Constitution, the procedures for which are relatively cumbersome.

Therefore, the government base lost its qualified majority in the Congress,
transitioning to a less unified government. The governance by the executive branch,
however, was not severely impaired because the executive could conveniently dismiss
constitutional amendments using lower-cost mechanisms. Legislation initiated by the
executive branch peaked in 2004 following the loss of a qualified majority.

Moreover, the executive branch already had the power of provisional
measures, which do not require legislative intervention for immediate action.

4

According to this hypothesis, the legislative allocation of provisional measures does
not stem from a showdown, crisis or delegation, but from a de jure primary
constitutional provision.
The Legal Redesign: Provisional Measures
The Brazilian executive plays an atypical legislative function through
regulatory decrees and delegated laws. Both require a priori legislative intervention
by issuing legislation that lacks regulation and a posteriori legislative intervention by
approving delegated laws. Moreover, the executive has the power to propose laws—
which represent 80% of the ordinary Brazilian legislation 10 —and constitutional
amendments. However, the provisional measures represent primary normative acts
with immediate legal efficacy, submitted for subsequent assessment by the Congress.
The executive plays a role equal to that of the legislators in these cases.
The Constitution provides that "[i]n case of relevance and urgency, the
President of the Republic may adopt provisional measures with the force of law, and
shall immediately submit them to Congress." If examined by the Congress, a simple
majority is sufficient to convert a provisional measure into law.11 If rejected or voided
in practice due to a lapse in time,12 the legal relations both constituted and resulting
from any acts performed during its validity shall be governed by them, according to
10

Article 47 of the Constitution stipulates that the deliberations of each house and its committees shall
be taken by a majority vote, provided the presence of an absolute majority of its members. Thus, for
the approval of an ordinary law in the Senate, which is composed of 81 members, 21 votes in favor are
required, highlighting the ease of the procedure as compared with constitutional amendments, which
require a three-fifths majority of the parliamentarians for approval (in the Senate, 49 votes out of the 81
senators).
11
In agreement with articles 84, subsection XXVI, and 62 and paragraphs of the 1988 Constitution, the
President of the republic has the exclusive responsibility to issue provisional measures (PMs). Such
norms have the force of ordinary law, upon publication, although the President must immediately
submit them to the National Congress for examination. Once sent to the Congress, the PM will be
examined by a joint committee of deputies and senators, which shall provide an opinion regarding its
constitutionality. Later, the PM will be submitted to a vote by the plenary of each house, starting with
the chamber, and will be approved by a simple majority in both plenaries, being thus converted into
law. The PMs can be approved and converted into law within a maximum of sixty days, which is
extendable for only one equal period. If this limit is exceeded, the PM becomes void dated to its
issuing. The Congress can adopt four attitudes when analyzing a PM: (a) approve it without changes;
b) approve it with amendments to the text prepared by the presidency of the republic; (c) not examine
the PM within the maximum time limit; or d) reject the PM. If the Congress does not examine or
rejects the PM, a legislative decree must be promulgated, regulating the legal relations brought about
by the PM, for the period in which it was effective. If the parliamentarians do not issue this legislative
decree until sixty days after the PM becomes valid, those legal relations will be governed by the
unexamined or rejected PM itself, providing the executive with a preponderance of will if the
Parliament does not pronounce itself.	
  
12
In this case, a legislative decree is rarely issued by the parliament.	
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the determinations of the executive.
However, "relevance" and "urgency" are not required of the legislative or
judicial examination. The convenience of passing provisional measures is largely
justified by the institutional capacities of the executive, which are higher than those
of the National Congress. However, this convenience essentially results from the
potential risk and burden that might arise from the possible showdown upon rejection
of the measures.

As shown in the above figure, the legislative branch converted 87% of the
provisional measures into law. Moreover, the 32nd constitutional amendment ratified
in 2001, though originally conceived to constrain the issuance of provisional
measures, was approved after expanding the executive discretion provided therein.
The PMs could therefore be considered a constitutional evil that many people regard
as necessary or positive, although it is a constitutional imperfection.13
The executive has made use of provisional measures even when their
consequent constitutional redesigns violate the permitted constitutional limits, which
not only violates the separation of powers, but the Constitution itself; art. 62, § 1, I, d,
provides that it is forbidden to issue provisional measures on matters related to
budgets and additional or supplementary credits, except for, pursuant to art. 167, to
meet unforeseeable and urgent expenses, such as those resulting from war, internal
commotion or public calamity.
13

GRABER, Mark. Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil. Cambridge University
Press: New York, 2006, p. 9.	
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However, as shown in the following figure the values of the aforementioned
expenses surpass any concept of extraordinariness.

The path convenient for the branches also has implications with respect to
judicial convenience. The Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF)
has repeatedly held that it is not competent to assess "relevance" and "urgency,"14 a
pre-requisite for the issuance of PMs. Moreover, when consulted on the opening of
extraordinary credits, the STF has stated that "the foreseen credits have either been
used or lost their validity, and therefore, no emendable situations subsist at the present
time."15
In another example, in the judgment of the direct action of unconstitutionality
4029/AM (03/2012), the STF "backed out"16 one day after a decision that declared the
formal unconstitutionality of the provisional measure that created the Chico Mendes
Institute (Instituto Chico Mendes) due to a procedural flaw in the examination of the
measure by the Congress following a point of order raised by the Attorney General of
the Union, a representative of the executive. By sweeping unconstitutionalities under
the rug, the STF attributed the potential effects to the decision, which threatened 500

14

Thus, the following should be noted: (i) "The understanding of this Court is that examination of
urgency and importance requirements can only be submitted to the judiciary when there is abuse of
discretion by the head of the executive branch. Regimental appeal that shall be withheld" (AI 489108,
2006); (ii) the "relevance and urgency requirements for issuing provisional measure are a
discretionary power of the head of the executive branch, hence should not be examined by the judiciary
branch , except in the case of a misuse of power. Understanding decided upon STF jurisprudence.
Action dismissed" (ADI 2150, 2002).
15
ADI nº 4.041, 2011.	
  
16
“The Switch in Time that Saved Eleven.” The radical change in the STF behavior is similar to that of
the US Supreme Court in 1937, after the failed court-packing plan of President Roosevelt.	
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prior provisional measures.17
The status quo of a "permanent crisis" and 400 claims of relevance and
urgency between 2003 and 2011 have prevented showdowns, eventual crises, higher
lawmaking or even judicial doctrine.18 The Brazilian "state of convenience" thus
surpasses the administrative state, though it does not necessarily make the executive
more effective. The continuous constitutional emergency, which derives from the
executive convenience and connivance, negates all other branches, causing them to be
frequently ignored and reserved.

Final Considerations
One can conclude that the supremacy of the Brazilian executive branch also
stems from the convenience of the other branches, a condition that avoids institutional
crises or confrontations. The present study presented two constitutional instruments,
constitutional amendments and provisional measures, that demonstrate those
relationships of convenience and the prestige enjoyed by the executive. The executive
has progressively and conveniently reduced the number constitutional amendments,
given the political burden of a formal constitutional amendment and the loss of a
qualified majority in the government base. However, the low-cost political tools
remain in use to preserve governance. The other branches rarely interfere with
provisional measures to avoid constitutional showdowns. The judiciary does not
precisely define relevance and urgency, abstaining itself from examining the
constitutionality of most provisional measures, and eventually modulates the effects
of its own decisions, making them "more beneficial" to the executive. Likewise, the
legislature ratifies the legislative assignment to the executive, converting provisional
measures into law and approving executive initiatives. Thus, the Brazilian executive
not only enjoys supremacy due to the convenience of the other branches but also
conveniently preserves the existence of these branches.

17

“We have found that, in spite of declaring the measures unconstitutional, it could generate a serious
social crisis of legal uncertainty and institutional crises, indicating that we should be careful with the
consequences of our decision” (Luiz Fux – Brazilian Supreme Court Justice).	
  
18
“We suggest that the central mechanism of constitutional change is not amendment, higher
lawmaking or even judicial doctrine, but episodes of conflict between institutions over the distribution
of policymaking authority.” POSNER, E.; VERMEULE, A. op. Cit. p. 67.	
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